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Platform Realism, Informational Inequality, and
Section 230 Reform
Olivier Sylvain

abstrac t . Online companies bear few duties under law to tend to the discrimination that
they facilitate or the disinformation that they deliver. Consumers and members of historically marginalized groups are accordingly the likeliest to be harmed. These companies should bear the same,
if not more, responsibility to guard against such inequalities.

introduction
As much as social-media companies have reconnected college roommates
and spread awareness about movements like #BLM and #MeToo, 1 they also
have contributed to the dysfunction of the current online information environment. They have helped cultivate bigotry, 2 discrimination, 3 and disinformation
about highly consequential social facts. 4 Worse still, they have distributed and

1.
2.
3.

4.
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SARAH J. JACKSON, MOYA BAILEY & BROOKE FOUCAULT WELLES, #HASHTAGACTIVISM: NET-

WORKS OF RACE AND GENDER JUSTICE, at xxv-xxviii (2020).

Joe Tidy, Twitter Apologises for Letting Ads Target Neo-Nazis and Bigots, BBC (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51112238 [https://perma.cc/8FDL-UTD8].
Karen Hao, Facebook’s Ad Algorithms Are Still Excluding Women from Seeing Jobs, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/04/09/1022217/facebook-adalgorithm-sex-discrimination [https://perma.cc/PHJ2-Y9RE]; Corin Faife & Alfred Ng,
Credit Card Ads Were Targeted by Age, Violating Facebook’s Anti-Discrimination Policy, MARKUP
(Apr. 29, 2021, 8:00 AM ET), https://themarkup.org/citizen-browser/2021/04/29/creditcard-ads-were-targeted-by-age-violating-facebooks-anti-discrimination-policy
[https://
perma.cc/P4H5-LXTW].
Corin Faife & Dara Kerr, Facebook Said It Would Stop Recommending Anti-Vaccine Groups. It
Didn’t, MARKUP (May 20, 2021, 8:00 ET), https://themarkup.org/citizen-browser/2021/05
/20/facebook-said-it-would-stop-recommending-anti-vaccine-groups-it-didnt
[https://
perma.cc/48DQ-WRJV].
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delivered such material without bearing the burden of anticipating or attending
to their social harms and costs.
These and other online companies remain free of any such legal obligation
because of courts’ broad interpretation of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA), which immunizes “interactive computer services” that host
or remove content posted by third parties. 5 Congress enacted Section 230 in
1996 to limit minors’ exposure to pornography, as well as to encourage free expression, self-regulation, and innovation online. 6 Courts have read the provision
broadly, generally dismissing complaints (before discovery) in which plaintiﬀs
allege that the defendant service has published unlawful material—or unlawfully
removed material from its platform. Courts will only allow a case to proceed
when the defendant “contributes materially” to the oﬀending content. 7
In this way, Section 230 has created a very strong incentive for creative entrepreneurs to build or promote interactive computer services that host usergenerated content. Novel social-media companies like Myspace, Foursquare, and
Friendster sprang up in the years immediately following its enactment. 8 These
services enabled their users to communicate with each other freely, about almost
anything. While community sites and online bulletin boards existed before Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, Section 230 gave a distinctive boost to the online
applications and services for user-generated content that most people today associate with the internet. 9
But that was a long time ago. Today, the most popular social-media companies do much more than serve as simple platforms for users’ free expression and
innovation. The most prominent online services are shrewd enterprises whose
main commercial objective is to collect and leverage user engagement for advertisers. Yet, until very recently, courts have allowed these companies to avoid public scrutiny because of the liability shield under Section 230.
It is past time for reform. I have elsewhere argued that courts should more
closely scrutinize online intermediaries’ designs on user-generated content and

5.

Section 230 is codiﬁed at 47 U.S.C. § 230.

6.

See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008).

7.
8.

Saheli Roy Choudhury, Foursquare Pioneered the Trend of ‘Checking-in’ to a Place —Now It Sells
Access to Its Data to Companies, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:20 AM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/30/foursquare-pioneered-the-trend-of-checking-in-to-aplace--now-it-sells-your-data-to-companies.html [https://perma.cc/L3KN-BYAL]; Max
Cha�in, How to Kill a Great Idea, INC. (June 1, 2007), https://www.inc.com/magazine
/20070601/features-how-to-kill-a-great-idea.html [https://perma.cc/QZF7-AJNC]..

9.

See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019)
(detailing how Section 230 created the framework of the modern internet).
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data. 10 And courts have begun to do so. They now are far more attentive to the
ways in which internet platforms’ prevailing ad-based business models and speciﬁc application design features necessarily facilitate harmful content and conduct, online and oﬄine. 11 Courts have also been far more alert to whether defendant intermediaries are acting as publishers or something else, as in the cases
in which plaintiﬀs have successfully alleged that online retailers and homesharing services are not “publishers” within the meaning of Section 230. 12
But a court-centered approach to reforming Section 230 will not suﬃce.
Courts cannot legislate, and in light of Section 230’s plain language, statutory
reform is probably the most eﬀective and direct way to update the doctrine. 13
A�er all, Congress cra�ed Section 230 to protect interactive computer services
that host third-party content. It is therefore up to Congress to adapt its aims to
the current state of aﬀairs. Consumers, but especially members of vulnerable and
historically marginalized groups, have the most to gain from revamping Section 230 to require all online intermediaries to mitigate the anticipated impacts
of their services. Reform is urgently needed because online service designs produce outcomes that conﬂict with hard-fought but settled consumer-protection
and civil-rights laws.
This Essay sets out the reasons why now is the moment for statutory reform.
Although this change would not ameliorate all of the social and economic ills for
which intermediaries are responsible, it would have the salutary eﬀect of ensuring that companies abide more closely to public-law norms and civic obligations.
That is what we expect from actors in other sectors of the economy. Companies
that have an outsized inﬂuence on public life should at least be held to the same
standards—if not stricter ones.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the current social-media
market and, in the process, argues that the role of social-media services in hosting and distributing third-party content is incident to their primary objective of
holding the attention of their users and collecting their data for advertisers.

10.

Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U.
(Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data
[https://perma.cc/E88P-G28M] [hereina�er Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs]; Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 214-15 (2018) [hereina�er Sylvain, Intermediary Duties].
11. Lemmon v. Snap Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021); Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824
F.3d. 846 (9th Cir. 2016); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D.
Cal. 2018), aﬀ ’d, 2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir. 2021).
12. See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
13.

Cf. Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 897 (“In light of the demonstrated ability to detect and isolate at least
some dangerous content, Congress may well decide that more regulation is needed.”).
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While this account has been made before, it is important for arguments in the
following Parts to illuminate how online companies operate in a manner at odds
with the how they and their defenders o�en describe themselves. Part II outlines
the incentives and positive theory for the prevailing laissez-faire approach to
content moderation and the legal doctrine that has given rise to the current state
of aﬀairs. In consideration of the market imperative to hold consumer attention,
the protections under Section 230 doctrine have in fact set out a perverse disincentive to moderate. Part III outlines how courts have started to see online intermediaries, especially the biggest actors, for what they are, impacting the ways in
which they make sense of whether a defendant is a “publisher” under Section 230. Finally, in Part IV, I return to a theme about which I have written elsewhere: the ways in which the robust protection under Section 230 has entrenched and, in some cases, deepened inequality in information markets. Free
markets might redound to the beneﬁt of consumers, but, as in other legislative
ﬁelds, patterns of exclusion and subordination proliferate in the absence of legal
rules against disparate impacts.
i.

platform realism

Not too long ago, many of the most popular social-media companies loudly
proclaimed to be champions of authentic voice, free expression, and human connection. 14 Their pronouncements o�en resembled marketing slogans and
branding strategies. But they also reﬂected an earnest and widely held belief—
that internet companies help people discover ideas and acquaintances in ways
that legacy media companies in print, radio, television, and cable had not and
could not. 15
14.

See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 17,
2019), https://about.�.com/news/2019/10/mark-zuckerberg-stands-for-voice-and-free-expression [https://perma.cc/BKL8-CKSG]; Nicholas Thompson, Jack Dorsey on Twitter’s Role
in Free Speech and Filter Bubbles, WIRED (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://www.wired.com
/story/jack-dorsey-twitters-role-free-speech-ﬁlter-bubbles
[https://perma.cc/S7FCMFQ6].
15. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 56-61 (2008) (“The old bargain of the newspaper—world news lumped in with horoscopes and ads from the pizza parlor—has now ended. The future presented by the internet
is the mass amateurization of publishing and a switch from ‘Why publish this?’ to ‘Why
not?’”); id. at 296-302 (suggesting that social media would lead to “an explosion of new
groups pursing new possibilities with new tools” which might be “painful for many existing
organizations” and have some “negative eﬀects” but would overall be “beneﬁcial” to society);
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 278-94 (2006) (“Ubiquitous Internet communications expand
something of the freedom of city parks and streets, but also the freedom of cafés and bars—
commercial platforms for social interaction—so that it is available everywhere.”); John Perry
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Today, most people are at best resigned to, and at worst weary of, their experiences with social media. 16 The same internet companies that proclaimed
themselves to be champions of free expression just a few years ago have since
backtracked. To be sure, they continue to promote themselves as platforms that
“give people the power to build community and bring the world closer.” 17 But
their recent moderation decisions and policies suggest a far more cautious approach. They had no choice. The pressure they received from politicians, advertisers, consumers, and public interest groups has forced them to more aggressively curtail the most corrosive and objectionable material that they host. These
eﬀorts have been especially urgent for popular social-media companies, including Facebook and Twitter, that purport to build communities and foster discussion. 18
But social-media companies generally have little concern for the nature of the
communities or discussions that they host. That is because they are not mere
platforms for authentic voice, free expression, and human connection. In fact,
social media’s ability to host and distribute third-party content—and thus to
connect people and build communities—is incident to its ravenous ambition to
hold the attention of their consumers and collect their data for advertisers. 19
Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eﬀ.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/283D-LM4D] (purporting that cyberspace will be a space free from existing power structures); Esther Dyson, George
Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin Toﬄer, Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta
for the Knowledge Age, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. (Aug. 1994), http://www.pﬀ.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/ﬁ1.2magnacarta.html [https://perma.cc/4BCZ-K63S] (speculating about the power of cyberspace to reform social and economic structures).
16.

The Future of Tech Policy: American Views, KNIGHT FOUND. (June 16, 2020), https://knightfoundation.org/reports/the-future-of-tech-policy-american-views [https://perma.cc/8ST72E4T] (“[J]ust a few years ago, Americans were overwhelmingly optimistic about the power
of new technologies to foster an informed and engaged society. More recently, however, that
conﬁdence has been challenged by emerging concerns over the role that internet and technology companies—especially social media—now play in our democracy.”).

17.

Our Mission: Give People the Power to Build Community and Bring the World Closer Together,
FACEBOOK,
https://about.facebook.com/company-info/?_ga=2.167895777.1341094359
.1623844710-1362261438.1613068707 [https://perma.cc/X268-AKKX].
18. Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter’s Asking for Help on How to Be Less Toxic, WASH. POST (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/01/twitters-asking
-for-help-on-how-to-be-less-toxic [https://perma.cc/QF8J-S8QA]; Barbara Ortutay & Michael Liedtke, Mark Zuckerberg Wants to Foster Communities, Not Just ‘Connections’, INC. (June
22, 2017), https://www.inc.com/associated-press/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-building-communities.html [https://perma.cc/973Z-MAKD].
19. Karen Hao, How Facebook Got Addicted to Spreading Misinformation, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 11,
2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/11/1020600/facebook-responsible-aimisinformation [https://perma.cc/4RFS-7BAZ]. See generally TIM WU, THE ATTENTION
MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS (2016) (discussing how socialmedia companies aim to hold consumer attention in order to increase ad revenue).
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The January 6, 2021 siege on the Capitol building demonstrated that socialmedia companies can even mobilize seething reactionary mobs. There is little
doubt that Twitter and Facebook helped to widely spread former President
Trump’s spurious claims about the 2020 presidential election, as well as a variety
of other assertions and posts that seemed to violate their content guidelines, in
the months and years before. 20 Their belated decisions to suspend his accounts
made this fact plain as day. But other prominent social-media companies were
also complicit, including Parler, 21 Reddit, 22 and YouTube. 23 They facilitated and
galvanized the groups that bore down on Washington, D.C. to invade the Capitol. They fostered racist and xenophobic white nationalist online communities,
provided forums for coordination among those groups, and helped to distribute
information about their plans. 24 What followed was only a matter of time. The

20.

Suhauna Hussain & Jeﬀ Bercovici, How Twitter Made Its Own Rules for Trump to Break, L.A.
TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-0529/how-twitter-made-its-own-rules-for-trump-to-break [https://perma.cc/C9C2-EFG3];
Casey Newton, Why Social Networks Keep Tripping over Their Own Content Moderation Policies,
VERGE (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/10/16/20915658/trumpshooting-video-facebook-ads-twitter-world-leaders-rule [https://perma.cc/72BA-HFD9].

21.

Aleszu Bajak, Jessica Guynn & Mitchell Thorson, When Trump Started His Speech Before the
Capitol Riot, Talk on Parler Turned to Civil War, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2021/02/01/civil-war-during-trumps-pre-riotspeech-parler-talk-grew-darker/4297165001 [https://perma.cc/NL7A-6YP2].

22.

Brian Heater, Reddit ‘Taking Action’ on Site Violations as Rioters Storm US Capitol,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 6, 2021), https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/06/reddit-taking-action-onsite-violations-as-rioters-storm-us-capitol [https://perma.cc/PW9G-CGXC].
23. Jennifer Elias, New Google Union Slams YouTube for ‘Lackluster’ Response to Trump and Capitol
Mob, CNBC (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/07/new-google-union-slamsyoutube-for-lackluster-response-to-trump.html [https://perma.cc/FT3T-VDMW]. This
was probably what instigated the former President’s misbegotten eﬀort to regulate social media. See Olivier Sylvain, Solve the Underlying Problem: Treat Social Media as Ad-Driven Companies, Not Speech Platforms, KNIGHT FOUND. (June 16, 2020), https://knightfoundation.org/articles/solve-the-underlying-problem-treat-social-media-as-ad-driven-companies-notspeech-platforms [https://perma.cc/MVG4-7PQW].
24. Jessica Guynn, ‘Burn down DC’: Violence that Erupted at Capitol Was Incited by Pro-Trump Mob
on Social Media, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/01
/06/trump-riot-twitter-parler-proud-boys-boogaloos-antifa-qanon/6570794002 [https://
perma.cc/2ZX8-8UZC]; Isobel Asher Hamilton, Plans to Storm the Capitol Were Circulating on
Social Media Sites, Including Facebook, Twitter, and Parler, for Days Before the Siege, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/plans-to-storm-the-capitol-circulated-onsocial-media-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/C6CB-Z96P]; Logan Jaﬀe, Lydia DePillis, Isaac
Arnsdorf & J. David McSwane, Capitol Rioters Planned for Weeks in Plain Sight. The Police
Weren’t Ready, PROPUBLICA (Jan 7. 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/capitol-rioters
-planned-for-weeks-in-plain-sight-the-police-werent-ready
[https://perma.cc/W4DKQU72].
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former President’s rhetoric and mendacity lit the match, but online services provided the kindling.
Of course, these companies are not in cahoots with the reactionaries who
promoted the attack on the Capitol. Things are more complicated. No matter the
platform, demagogues and clever companies exploit a variety of biases for political gain and convince unwitting consumers to do things they might not otherwise do. 25 Still, the big social-media companies’ main objective is to hold consumers’ attention for advertisers irrespective of these miscreants’ aims. The
companies’ stated goal of fostering community is an incident of their pecuniary
imperative to optimize consumer engagement. This objective is not unqualiﬁed;
social-media companies have long-term incentives to deemphasize content that
oﬀends the majority of their consumers, so that consumers will continue using
their platforms. 26 But those long-term incentives have not been strong enough
to curtail the distribution of hateful, violent, and debasing user content and advertisements. Thus, alongside clips of lawyers inadvertently talking through cat
ﬁlters and clever dance sequences, newsfeeds and recommendations are also
ﬁlled with baseless headlines about crackpot conspiracies, bigoted calls for violence, and advertisements for far-right militia merchandise—despite policies
that ban “militia content.” 27
All of this has disillusioned many, if not most, consumers and policy oﬃcials.
Advertisers have noticed. Companies generally do not want to associate their
brands with toxic and divisive content. 28 This is why the most popular internet

25.

Daniel Kreiss, Regina G. Lawrence & Shannon C. McGregor, Political Identity Ownership: Symbolic Contests to Represent Members of the Public, 6 SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y 2-3 (June 10, 2020);
Scott Ikeda, California Bans Deceptive “Dark Patterns” with Update to State Privacy Law, CPO
MAG. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/california-bans-deceptive-dark-patterns-with-update-to-state-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/ES5P-HJGE]; see
also Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 48-58 (2021) (setting out a taxonomy of dark patterns).
26. See Nick Clegg, You and the Algorithm: It Takes Two to Tango, MEDIUM (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://nickclegg.medium.com/you-and-the-algorithm-it-takes-two-to-tango7722b19aa1c2 [https://perma.cc/ZJP4-B8RX].
27.

Jeremy B. Berrill, Tech Firms Proﬁted from Far-Right Militia Content Despite Ban on “Three
Percenters,” Markup (Jan. 21, 2021, 11:50 AM), https://themarkup.org/news/2021/01/21/tech
-ﬁrms-proﬁted-from-far-right-militia-content-despite-ban-on-three-percenters [https://
perma.cc/RW7U-8X7T].

28.

See, e.g., Olivia Solon, Google’s Bad Week: YouTube Loses Millions as Advertising Row Reaches the
U.S., GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017
/mar/25/google-youtube-advertising-extremist-content-att-verizon
[https://perma.cc
/2LUU-V85W].
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companies today seem to have shi�ed away from being beacons of free speech. 29
Some internet companies have even called for increased government oversight
or regulation. 30
For several years, legal scholars and social scientists have been recommending creative design tweaks that are more varied than the familiar but unsatisfyingly binary “keep-up versus take-down” framework.31 Internet companies have

29.

Gilad Edelman, On Social Media, American-Style Free Speech Is Dead, WIRED (Apr. 27, 2021,
8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/on-social-media-american-style-free-speech-isdead [https://perma.cc/22AZ-BQ45].

30.

E.g., Mark Zuckerberg, Big Tech Needs More Regulation, META NEWSROOM (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://about.�.com/news/2020/02/big-tech-needs-more-regulation
[https://perma.cc
/MB85-JANV]. They have done so even as content moderation is costly and otherwise resource intensive. Jullian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken. Let Us
Count the Ways., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eﬀ.org/deeplinks
/2019/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways
[https://perma.cc/MNU449AD]; Mike Masnick, Content Moderation at Scale Is Impossible: Recent Examples of Misunderstanding Context, TECHDIRT (Feb 26, 2021), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210225
/10365146316/content-moderation-scale-is-impossible-recent-examples-misunderstandingcontext.shtml [https://perma.cc/EVK5-26EC]. See generally Tarleton Gillespie, Content Moderation, AI, and the Question of Scale, 7 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (2020) (challenging the view that
companies should automate content moderation, even assuming they could). But there is
good reason to doubt that they are motivated by purely altruistic impulses when they do. A�er
all, the biggest internet companies are likely to beneﬁt from new regulations that, while potentially burdensome, will be easier for them to abide by than it will be for upstarts and
smaller rivals. To the extent that an online service moderates content—and most, if not all, do
in some way—it is easier for a company with more technological sophistication and absolute
resources to do so. See Mike Isaac, Mark Zuckerberg’s Call to Regulate Facebook, Explained, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/technology/mark-zuckerberg
-facebook-regulation-explained.html [https://perma.cc/TW75-R282]. While, hypothetically, smaller companies could, the larger companies are more likely to be in the enviable position of being able to “moderate at scale,” as hard as that task is. See Bobbie Johnson, How a
Democratic Plan to Reform Section 230 Could Backﬁre, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 8, 2021), https://
www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/08/1017625/safe-tech-section-230-democrat-reform
[https://perma.cc/SC9U-SX5A] (quoting Eric Goldman, who said that “Section 230 reform
won’t stick it to Big Tech. Section 230 reform will deepen the incumbents’ competitive moats
to make it even harder for new entrants to compete”); Jason Kelley, Section 230 Is Good, Actually, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.eﬀ.org/deeplinks/2020/12/section
-230-good-actually [https://perma.cc/D8JJ-MKSJ] (“Though calls to reform Section 230 are
frequently motivated by disappointment in Big Tech’s speech moderation policies, evidence
shows that further reforms to Section 230 would make it more diﬃcult for new entrants to
compete with Facebook or Twitter—and would likely make censorship worse, not better.”);
see also Matt Perault, Well-Intentioned Section 230 Reform Could Entrench the Power of Big Tech,
SLATE (June 1, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/06/section-230-reformantitrust-big-tech-consolidation.html [https://perma.cc/9DVA-F9KS] (discussing potential
eﬀects of Section 230 on the Big Tech industry).

31.

See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Content Moderation Remedies, MICH. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810580 [https://perma.cc/Z8F7-ZHSQ].
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been listening; today, they are taking demonstrable steps to tamp down their
most toxic and alarming content through creative adjustments to the designs of
their user interfaces. 32 The biggest social-media companies are introducing friction into the ways in which their consumers share and engage content.33 Twitter
and Facebook, for example, started ﬂagging dubious political ads and claims by
high-ranking elected oﬃcials a couple of years ago. 34 They do this by placing
visual and textual “content labels” alongside suspect user-generated posts in order to inform consumers about misleading or harmful content. 35 Other notable
design tweaks include “circuit breakers” that limit the ampliﬁcation or viral
spread of toxic content. 36 Twitter, for example, recently started sending users
warnings before they post anything that its automated content-review systems
anticipate as being potentially harmful or oﬀensive. 37 Research has shown that
“frictive prompts” like these may curb people’s impulse to post. 38 Twitter also
32.

See, e.g., Our Commitments, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/ourcommitments/curbing-extremist-content [https://perma.cc/47AR-23V9].

33.

See Ellen P. Goodman, Karen Kornbluh & Eli Weiner, The Stakes of User Interface Design for
Democracy, GERMAN MARHSALL FUND U.S. (June 30, 2021), https://www.gmfus.org/publications/stakes-user-interface-design-democracy [https://perma.cc/RKL7-GK9Y].
34. Fadel Allassan, Twitter and Facebook Label Trump Tweet on Absentee Ballot Ruling as Misleading,
AXIOS (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.axios.com/trump-twitter-facebook-labels-tweet-posteb34d4cb-eb46-477f-8e1c-a587ad364835.html [https://perma.cc/38LP-8QKY]. Some interventions like these, however, are more eﬀective than others. See Tom Dobber, Sanne Kruikemeier, Ellen P. Goodman, Natali Helberger & Sophie Minihold, Eﬀectiveness of Online Political
Ad Disclosure Labels: Empirical Findings, U. AMSTERDAM INST. INFO. L. (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.uva-icds.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Summary-transparency-discloures-experiment_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FCX-W5G8]; Deepa Seetharaman,
Twitter’s Labels for Trump Tweets Show Platforms’ Split Over Political Speech, WALL ST. J. (May
28, 2020, 12:57 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitters-labels-for-trump-tweets-showplatforms-split-over-political-speech-11590621829 [https://perma.cc/F55T-URF3].
35.

For a recent discussion of content labeling, see generally Garrett Morrow, Briony SwireThompson, Jessica M. Polny, Matthew Kopec & John P. Wihbey, The Emerging Science of
Content Labeling: Contextualizing Social Media Content Moderation (Dec. 3, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3742120 [https://perma.cc/M6TKYBY6].
36. Goodman et al., supra note 33.
37.

Anita Butler & Albeto Parrella, Tweeting with Consideration, TWITTER BLOG (May 5, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2021/tweeting-with-consideration [https://
perma.cc/XM9V-2S8E].
38. See generally Ellen Goodman & Karen Kornbluh, The Stakes of User Interface Design for Democracy, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND U.S. (June 2021), https://www.gmfus.org/publications
/stakes-user-interface-design-democracy [https://perma.cc/V6GN-AH9Q] (delineating
how neutral design principles can be used to empower, instead of exploit, users); Ellen Goodman, Digital Information Fidelity and Friction, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. UNIV. (Feb.
26, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/digital-ﬁdelity-and-friction [https://perma
.cc/FG2D-FBNC].
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recently made changes to the ways in which it crops the photographs that its
users post. 39 Before Twitter made those changes, research suggested that its “saliency algorithm” featured images of white people more than those of Black people and focused on women’s chests or legs rather than their other physical attributes. 40
These tweaks are a sign that social-media companies are alert to consumers’
distaste for certain kinds of content and content-distribution methods. But these
changes elide far more pressing problems. As I explain below in Section II.B and
Part III, under current law, companies may still distribute harmful or illegal content even if they control the ways in which they deliver that material. 41 Under
Section 230, Congress created a safe harbor to encourage online companies to
host and moderate third-party content, “unfettered” by government regulation. 42 This, according to the courts, was the dra�ers’ unrestrictive approach to
encouraging innovation and content regulation, both at once. 43
In this way, through Section 230, Congress promulgated a court-administered innovation policy that aimed to promote a certain kind of online business
design—platforms for user-generated content. But legislators in 1996 could not
anticipate how shielding this form of “interactive computer service” would beget
companies whose main objective would be to optimize consumer engagement
for advertisers, unencumbered by the social costs and harms that online content
39.

Rumman Chowdhury, Sharing Learnings About Our Image Cropping Algorithm, TWITTER
ENG’G (May 19, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/topics/insights/2021
/sharing-learnings-about-our-image-cropping-algorithm.html [https://perma.cc/T6AWRWLG].

40.

Id. Also consider the company’s reported plan for a tiered subscription service. The premium
level of service would cost about three dollars per month and feature an “undo tweets” function and a folder for bookmarked content. Kim Lyons, Twitter May Be Working on Twitter Blue,
a Subscription Service that Would Cost $2.99 Per Month, VERGE (May 15, 2021, 11:40 AM EDT),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/5/15/22437690/twitter-blue-subscription-service-299undo-tweets [https://perma.cc/X2DV-MTB8]; Chaim Gartenberg, Twitter Is Surveying Users
on What Features They’d Want from a Subscription, VERGE (July 31, 2020, 12:46 PM EDT),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/31/21349644/twitter-subscription-service-survey-undosent-analytics-feature-ideas [https://perma.cc/NYL8-97FP]. Other creative recommendations focus on processes for “accountability and repair” for the victims of cyberharassment, as
well as their deplatformed attackers. See, e.g., Sarita Schoenebeck, Carol F. Scott, Emma Hurley, Tammy Chang & Ellen Selkie, Youth Trust in Social Media Companies and Expectations of
Justice: Accountability and Repair A�er Online Harassment, 5 HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION,
Apr. 2021, at 14, https://yardi.people.si.umich.edu/pubs/Schoenebeck_AccountabilityRepair2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY46-4VJ9].
41. See, e.g., Vanessa Barbara, Opinion, Miracle Cures and Magnetic People. Brazil’s Fake News Is
Utterly Bizarre., N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/05/opinion/brazil-fake-news-bolsonaro.html [https://perma.cc/PR35-FC9M].
42.
43.
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and expressive conduct imposes on others.44 The design tweaks I enumerate
above may arise from the market imperative to keep consumer demand, but it
also bumps up against a far more compelling market incentive to hold and quantify consumer attention for advertisers. Social-media companies, wedded to the
extraordinary amounts of ad revenue that they generate, are today in no position
to redress this incentive structure. The current information environment is proof
enough.
ii.

market for moderation

Only Congress, the architect of Section 230’s regulatory scheme, is capable
of reforming the prevailing incentive structure motivating social-media companies. In Section II.A below, I sketch out the argument for the current laissez-faire
approach, before turning to reasons for legislative or regulatory reform in Section II.B.
A. The Laissez-Faire Logic for Online Platforms
Market pressures evidently aﬀect the ways in which social-media companies
choose to distribute content. This presents a challenge for people who believe
that legislation, regulation, civil litigation, or criminal enforcement (and the
threat of their occurrence) aﬀect internet companies.45 A�er all, due to the expansive protection courts aﬀord platforms under Section 230, 46 few articulated
legal rules preﬁgure how intermediaries may distribute or moderate content. To
the extent any exist, they inﬂuence (but do not resolve) how intermediaries may
distribute online content that violates criminal law,47 intellectual-property law,48

44.

The Impact of the Law That Helped Create the Internet and an Examination of Proposed Reforms
for Today’s Online World: Hearing on the PACT Act and Section 230 Before the Subcomm. on
Commc’ns, Tech., Innovation & the Internet, 116th Cong. 6 (2020) (statement of Rep. Cox).
45. Cf. Book Note, In the Shadow of the Law by Kermit Roosevelt, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1367 (2007);
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
46.
47.
48.

See infra Section II.B and Part iii.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2018).
See id. § 230(e)(2); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2018) (limiting liability of online service providers for copyright infringement).
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telephone consumer-privacy law, 49 and sex-traﬃcking laws. 50 Yet, despite the
absence of such constraints, companies appear to be taking the initiative by,
among other things, deplatforming demagogues and fashioning new ways to
tamp down the distribution of disinformation. 51
This is why advocates of the current regulatory regime, as spare as it is, stand
on good ground when they defend the status quo. They tend to subscribe to a
beguiling classical conception of free markets. 52 For them, the unregulated market for “interactive computer services” has promoted experimentation, innovation, learning, and discovery in ways that could never be possible were the law
more heavy-handed about restricting content. Freedom may have its costs, they
allow, but those are the incidents of progress and learning. Even the most quotidian and frivolous of online exchanges could be valuable.53 Law should not
chill free authentic democratic deliberation, such as it is.

49.

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4) (2018); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018) (prohibiting “[i]nterception
and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications” with certain exemptions for communications service providers).
50. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2018); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595 & 2421(a) (2018) (criminalizing sex traﬃcking).
51. See Facebook Suspends Trump Accounts for Two Years, BBC (June 5, 2021), https://www.bbc
.com/news/world-us-canada-57365628 [https://perma.cc/VG94-37MD]; Kari Paul, Twitter
Targets Covid Vaccine Misinformation with Labels and ‘Strike’ System, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2020,
6:05 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/mar/01/twitter-coronavirus-vaccine-misinformation-labels [https://perma.cc/E2MG-7XKA].
52.

See generally Olivier Sylvain, ‘AOL v. Zeran’: The Cyberlibertarian Hack of §230 Has Run Its
Course, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017, 1:15 AM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/aol-v-zeran-the-cyberlibertarian-hack-of-%C2%A7230-has-run-itscourse [https://perma.cc/WPN9-4N9L] (identifying the claims that the most celebrated advocates of broad protection for online speech in the mid-1990s made).
53. Some exchanges and online conversations may seem inconsequential but may nevertheless be
aﬀecting and productive, as when one Twitter user decided to question the talent of a celebrity
musician. “I don’t think pretty privilege has carried anyone better than it carried Alicia Keys,”
the user wrote. @seyi-baby, TWITTER (May 8, 2021, 12:21 PM), https://twitter.com/seyi
_baby/status/1391065839026196482 [https://perma.cc/HV22-3PMU]. This was playful if
poorly thought-through banter. As innocuous as it may have seemed, however, the tweet became a momentary ﬂashpoint for discussions about musicianship, race, and contested conceptions of beauty. It set oﬀ a torrent of reactions, the vast majority of which disagreed. See,
e.g., @Nerdiac, TWITTER (May 8, 2021, 2:20 PM), https://twitter.com/Nerdiac/status
/1391095639744856067 [https://perma.cc/G5PA-A83D] (“Alicia Keys is one of the few times
the industry got it right. Total package: writer, producer, musician, beautiful, vocals, and
young. They debuted her quick because they’d be fools not to. Her being pretty is a given,
ALL mainstream music stars are good looking. You clownin.”). The original tweet hit a nerve
and Twitter’s moderation algorithms shuttled it from user to user until it started “trending.”
Thousands of similar episodes likely take place across the internet every day. They create opportunities for engagement—explicit and sublimated—on the challenging and not-so-challenging preoccupations of the day. This is presumably what Twitter founder Jack Dorsey had

486

platform realism, informational inequality, and section 230 reform

Other proponents of the status quo laissez-faire approach might recognize
that regulation would be necessary if the market for online services was not ﬁlled
with variety. But, as there are none of the same trappings of scarcity online as
there are in other industries, they might argue, regulation is not necessary. Users
enjoy an abundance of options for content and services. The means of production are diﬀerent, too. Indeed, the barriers to entry for content creators are low:
almost anyone can publish anything on some platform. Or they can create their
own substack, Medium account, or webpage. And the market for online content
moderation responds to consumer demand. Users who want a heavily curated
and moderated online experience can patronize a variety of familiar content producers. On the one hand, prominent producers of online content like Amazon,
Netﬂix, Peacock, and Disney Plus oﬀer heavily curated entertainment that features their content and excludes much content of other companies. Consumers
can also ﬁnd or subscribe to matching and recommendation services in specialized areas: everything from music sharing sites like SoundCloud or BandCamp,
to health technology sharing sites for doctors like Doximity, to sites that facilitate
the buying and selling of unregistered ﬁrearms like Armslist. Consumers may
also ﬁnd services that restrict harmful content, such as services that forbid sexually explicit material like Instagram. Other consumers will prefer services that
are ostensibly far more permissive like Parler. Still others will look for services
that host the most alarming and oﬀensive content, including websites like Gab
that distribute material that is racist, misogynist, white-nationalist, and antisemitic. 54
This is the unfettered market for online content and services. Proponents of
the laissez-faire approach contend that, as vibrant as the information ecosystem
is, neither legislatures nor regulators should intervene; the free market for content moderation and recommendation is robust in ways that, for them, is normatively desirable and consistent with prevailing First Amendment doctrine. 55
in mind when, in explaining the social-media company’s decision to deplatform former President Trump, he asserted that social media was a platform for democratic deliberation. See
Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2021, 7:16 PM ET), https://twitter.com/jack/status/1349510784620003330?lang=en [https://perma.cc/JY9K-5MCX] (“I believe the internet
and global public conversation is our best and most relevant method of achieving this. I also
recognize it does not feel that way today. Everything we learn in this moment will better our
eﬀort, and push us to be what we are: one humanity working together.”).
54.

See Micah Lee, Inside Gab, the Online Safe Space for Far-Right Extremists, INTERCEPT (Mar. 15,
2021, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2021/03/15/gab-hack-donald-trump-parler-extremists [https://perma.cc/WAJ9-895R]; Tanya Basu, The “Manosphere” Is Getting More
Toxic as Angry Men Join the Incels, TECH. REV. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/07/349052/the-manosphere-is-getting-more-toxic-as-angry-menjoin-the-incels [https://perma.cc/SB7D-WVC2].

55.

See, e.g., Daphne Keller, Ampliﬁcation and Its Discontents, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM.
UNIV. (June 8, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/ampliﬁcation-and-its-
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The positive case for the laissez-faire approach resonates with an emerging
view that companies, especially internet companies, have a constitutional right
to decide which ideas to distribute or promote and which ideas to demote or
block. 56 The strongest version of this view conceives of almost all information
ﬂows, even overtly commercial ones, as presumptively protected communicative
acts under the First Amendment—notwithstanding the fact that in other contexts, overtly commercial speech is aﬀorded less protection than other expressive
acts. 57 Scholars have labeled this emergent view the “New Lochner” because of
the ways in which courts have applied the strong constitutional interest in free
speech to shield commercial activities that historically have not been protected.58
These writers invoke Lochner v. New York, 59 a Supreme Court case notorious for
its grotesquely expansive view of freedom to contract that overrode Congress’s
interest in minimum-wage and maximum-hours labor legislation.60 Some of the
more recognizable contemporary artifacts of the New Lochner are the Supreme
Court’s decisions on campaign-ﬁnance regulation (such as Citizens United v.
FEC, 61 in which the Court invalidated limits on contributions to issue advertising) and targeted marketing (such as Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,62 in which the
Court struck down limits on promotional campaigns by pharmaceutical companies). 63
discontents [https://perma.cc/EB92-N9R4] (“[P]latforms’ own algorithmic ranking and
recommendation have been held to constitute protected speech. A law explicitly prohibiting
such speech—or requiring platforms to replace their own preferred algorithm with the state’s
preferred algorithm, as a chronological ranking mandate would do—is likely to face real constitutional problems.”); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-36 (2017)
(“[S]ocial media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First
Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 870 (1997))).
56.

See, e.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at
*3-4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003); Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2020).
57. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
58.

See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 136 (tracing the ways in
which companies and commercial interests have successfully invoked the First Amendment
as a powerful deregulatory tool across legislative ﬁelds over the past few decades).
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60.

See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (explaining the
ways in which scholars, teachers, lawyers, and writers invoke “anticanonical cases” like Lochner to “dispel dissensus about or sanitize the Constitution” in ways that may obfuscate the
evolution and contested nature of the founding document).

61.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
564 U.S. 552 (2011).

62.
63.
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Against this backdrop, proponents of the current regime warn about the unintended consequences of regulation. Social-media companies have been demonstrably creative, innovative, and proliﬁc; they have transformed the internet
into a vast bazaar of goods for everyone. They fear that legal oversight will have
a chilling eﬀect on innovation and expression. 64 Developers anxious about attracting legal trouble will be less creative and adventurous about pursuing untested business models and novel content, eﬀectively entrenching the power of
the biggest companies. 65 They also posit that it might backﬁre against vulnerable
groups and minorities that espouse unpopular views. 66 This could have the affect of silencing social movements for reform, including, for example, #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo. Some even worry that entrepreneurs in this country
would lose their competitive edge if the United States imposes legal constraints
on what internet companies can develop or sell. 67
abridgment of speech”). Justice Kavanaugh, who was not on the bench when the Court announced Citizens United and Sorrell, is now the clearest proponent of this muscular conception
of speech on the Court. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 426-31 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that broadband-service providers have a First
Amendment right to be free from open-internet regulation).
64.

See, e.g., Christopher Mims, How Congress Might Upend Section 230, the Law Big Tech Is Built
on, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2021, 12:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-congressmight-upend-section-230-the-internet-law-big-tech-is-built-on-11613172368 [https://perma
.cc/45RL-YNPA] (explaining that, if social-media companies have to return to their pre-1996
legal status, they would likely “have to drastically narrow the scope and volume of what’s
permitted on their platforms”); see also Daphne Keller, Ampliﬁcation and Its Discontents,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. UNIV. 9-17 (June 8, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org
/content/ampliﬁcation-and-its-discontents [https://perma.cc/5HMG-EL4Z] (arguing that
laws that regulate content ampliﬁcation would encourage companies to “over-enforce and
suppress lawful speech”).

65.

See Mark Weinstein, Small Sites Need Section 230 to Compete, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2021, 2:16
PM
ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-sites-need-section-230-to-compete11611602173 [https://perma.cc/EDU8-826K] (arguing that revoking Section 230 “would signiﬁcantly harm smaller companies” and “new startups that compete with the tech giants,” as
only the biggest companies would have the resources to “hire the massive modernization and
legal teams that would be necessary to defend themselves” against liability); Matt Perault,
Well-Intentioned Section 230 Reform Could Entrench the Power of Big Tech, SLATE (June 1, 2021,
9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/06/section-230-reform-antitrust-big-techconsolidation.html [https://perma.cc/4CCD-92AZ] (making a similar argument).
66. Billey Easley, Revising the Law that Lets Platforms Moderate Content Will Silence Marginalized
Voices, SLATE (Oct. 29, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/section-230marignalized-groups-speech.html [https://perma.cc/98J9-3D2L] (“There are likely marginalized groups today who have not yet come to more mainstream acceptance that will be denied
this same opportunity [to speak freely] if they do not have open internet platforms that allow
users to generate their own content.”).
67. Comments of Consumer Technology Association, in the Matter of Section 230 of the Communications
Act of 1934, CONSUMER TECH. ASS’N (Sept. 2, 2020) https://cdn.cta.tech/cta/media/media
/advocacy/issues/comments-of-cta-rm-11862.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2HJ-AVAS] (“The
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B. The Disincentive to Moderate
But none of this means that social-media companies are unaﬀected by law.
Even though there is no positive law regulating content moderation, internet
companies have been free to develop moderation standards because of the protection under Section 230. For over two decades, the courts have concluded that,
pursuant to Section 230(c)(1), 68 online intermediaries are not liable for the unlawful material that their users create or develop. 69 Nor, under Section 230(c)(2), are companies legally responsible for their decisions to remove
or block third-party content or make ﬁltering technology available.70 Congress
concluded that if such companies were held liable for any of these activities, the
free ﬂow of ideas and information would slow and stall. 71 Courts accordingly
have shielded intermediaries from liability to the extent those companies provide
platforms for third-party content, no matter how heinous the material is. 72
This protection goes beyond the protections that the First Amendment provides. That is, Section 230 shields defendants from liability for third-party content that falls outside the scope of First Amendment protections, including

unique balance of protections aﬀorded by Section 230 has enabled the United States to be the
global leader in internet innovation.”).
68.

The term Section 230 is colloquial as much as a simple indication of its codiﬁcation. See 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2018). Congress enacted the provision as part of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA), which amended Title 47 in several places. See, e.g., id. § 223 (setting forth
prohibitions, which the CDA amended, on sending obscene or harassing comments by means
of a telecommunications device). The Supreme Court invalidated those other provisions, see
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that two CDA provisions violated the freedom
of speech), so that, now, Section 230 is all that remains.
69. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2003); Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under
L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d
413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LCC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th
Cir. 2014); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2016); Herrick v. Grindr Holding Co., 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019); Dyroﬀ v. Ultimate So�ware Grp., 934 F.3d 1093,
1094 (9th Cir. 2019).
70.

71.

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2018). Section 230(c)(2)(B) provides a third protection for entities that provide content ﬁltering—that is, for “interactive computer service[s]” that “enable
or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access” to content. This provision is rarely, if ever, litigated.

See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“The specter of tort liability in an area of such proliﬁc speech would
have an obvious chilling eﬀect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of
their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.”).
72. See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 897-99 (9th Cir. 2021).
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defamation or commercial speech. 73 Evidently, Congress’s aim was to ensure that
all views and ideas, even abhorrent ones, are exposed and debated in the marketplace of ideas.
Courts have read Section 230 to bar third-party liability suits against intermediaries, even when the companies know that their services will distribute unlawful or illicit content. 74 This is a departure from traditional publisher liability
rules in common-law tort, as well as the general principles of third-party liability
across legislative ﬁelds. 75 Under the ﬁrst of the protections—Section 230(c)(1)—
plaintiﬀs must successfully establish that an intermediary has “contribute[d]
materially” to the development of the content in order for such suits to proceed
to discovery, let alone succeed on the merits. 76 Pursuant to the second protection—Section 230(c)(2)(A) 77—an online service’s decision to takedown or block
third-party content is not actionable if that decision is voluntary and in “good
faith.” 78 The third, far less litigated protection shields intermediaries who make
ﬁltering technology available. 79
In its foundational interpretation of the ﬁrst of those provisions almost a
quarter century ago, a Fourth Circuit panel concluded in Zeran v. America Online,
Inc. that “[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such proliﬁc speech would

73.

This is to say nothing of its other procedural advantages. See generally Eric Goldman, Why
Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33 (2019)
(explaining that Section 230 provides defendants with more substantive and procedural beneﬁts than the First Amendment does).
74. See, e.g., Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d at 414; Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 21.
75.

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333-34.
76. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC , 521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) to impose a material-contribution requirement for liability).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2018).
78.

Enigma So�ware Grp. U.S.A., L.L.C. v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir.
2019) (holding that § 230(c)(2)(A) does not apply to claims that the defendant blocked access
to the plaintiﬀ ’s services for anticompetitive reasons). For what it is worth, courts have also
dismissed plaintiﬀs’ claims that “deplatforming” decisions or takedowns violate the First
Amendment because they are biased against certain viewpoints. See, e.g., Prager Univ. v.
Google, 951 F.3d 991, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that YouTube’s decision to demonetize
plaintiﬀ ’s YouTube channel did not violate the First Amendment because YouTube is not a
state actor and does not perform a “quintessential public function” that implicates that constitutional provision). When rejecting such claims, courts have explained that plaintiﬀs have
it backwards. The prevailing doctrine, the Ninth Circuit recently clariﬁed, presumes that private companies, like individuals, have the constitutional right to choose what content to carry,
no matter how big they are; consumers do not have a corollary right to speak freely on those
services. Id.; see also Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019)
(holding that the First Amendment “prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech,” not
“private abridgment of speech”).
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) (2018).
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have an obvious chilling eﬀect” because of the “staggering” amount of thirdparty content that ﬂows through their servers, some of which is surely unlawful
or harmful. 80 The panel accordingly decided to read Section 230’s protections
broadly, but without specifying which of the three protections among Section 230(c)(1), 230(c)(2)(A), or 230(c)(2)(B) it was interpreting. 81 Otherwise,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, online companies would likely choose “to severely
restrict the number and type of messages posted.” 82 Under that logic, the doctrine should be broadly protective and generous “to avoid any such restrictive
eﬀect.” 83 Moreover, the court inferred a congressional belief that intermediaries
would have it in their commercial self-interest to regulate content to keep their
consumers happy; consumer demand would be regulation enough and, in any
case, a far better judge of which content ought to be allowed. 84
Federal and state courts across the country have since adopted this reasoning. 85 Almost two decades later, in a case involving an online service that notoriously facilitated sex traﬃcking of minors, the First Circuit elaborated that this
“hands-oﬀ approach is fully consistent with Congress’s avowed desire to permit
the continued development of the internet with minimal regulatory interference.” 86
But as understood by the courts, Congress did more than simply set out a
legal protection for “interactive computer service[s].” 87 It privileged services that
host and distribute user-generated content in particular by removing all

80.

129 F.3d at 331.
Id. The panel did not distinguish among the protections under §§ (c)(1), (c)(2)(A), or
(c)(2)(B). It also altogether omitted the fact that Congress appeared to have been most interested in the operative Good Samaritan aims under the second of the provisions (§ 230(c)(2)),
and not § 230(c)(1). See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress emphasized the narrow civil liability shield that became § 230(c)(2), rather than the broad rule of construction laid out in
§ 230(c)(1).”); see also Doe v. G.T.E. Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (speculating
that such a broad protection is a disincentive to moderate tortious user-generated content).
82. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
81.

83.

Id.
84. Id.
85.
86.

See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 157, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).

Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, system, or access so�ware provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including speciﬁcally a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services oﬀered by libraries or educational
institutions.”).
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aﬃrmative duties under law to monitor, moderate, or block illegal content.88
Legislators, of course, did not invent online forums like these. Electronic bulletin
boards, newsgroups, and similar online communities proliferated in the years
before legislators enacted Section 230. Indeed, Congress intervened in 1996 because a trial-level state court decision in New York assigned secondary liability
to an online service that distributed defamatory statements by one of their users. 89 Section 230 overturned that decision. 90 Through its legislation, Congress
signaled a policy preference for a certain kind of user-focused service design. 91
Silicon Valley responded almost immediately. Investors and internet entrepreneurs eagerly started developing services that feature “user-generated content” with the knowledge that they would not be held legally responsible for any
of it. 92 Put diﬀerently, the protection under Section 230(c) and the Zeran rule
that soon followed established a new disincentive for companies to create, develop, or showcase their own content. It is no surprise, then, that emergent companies at this early stage shied away from content production and instead created
services for “user-generated content” without fear of legal exposure, 93 even if
they knew or could reasonably anticipate that their consumers would use the
new services to do harm. Congress and the courts, in short, have created the
statutory equivalent of an invisibility cloak for services that feature (but do not
contribute to) third-party content. 94

88.

See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171-72 (“The claim against the website was, in eﬀect, that it
failed to review each user-created proﬁle to ensure that it wasn’t defamatory. That is precisely
the kind of activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of Section 230. With respect to the defamatory content, the website operator was merely a passive
conduit and thus could not be held liable for failing to detect and remove it.”); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. LeadClick, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that Section 230 “bars ‘lawsuits
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content’” provided by another for publication (quoting Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d
398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014))).

89.

See 141 CONG. REC. 22,044-45 (statement of Rep. John Cox discussing Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy, No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)).

90.

Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d 53, 79 (2d Cir. 2019).
91. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (observing Section 230 reﬂects Congress’s decision “not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability
on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages”).
92.

KOSSEFF, supra note 9, at 120-22.
93. Content producers today like Amazon, Netﬂix, and Disney aggressively develop and control
access to content on the internet. But they do not enjoy Section 230 protection generally.
94. The Supreme Court has recognized the “technology-forcing” aspect of law. See Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983). State Farm, for example,
is less known for its signiﬁcant place in technology law than in administrative-law doctrine,
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Ever since, a ready-made populist ideology has supplied more normative he�
to this legal ﬁction, going beyond the laissez-faire justiﬁcations set out above. It
posits that, with the internet, consumers no longer have to abide by the unilateral designs and service terms of powerful legacy media companies and retailers.
The internet will empower consumers to be the architects of their own online
experiences. 95 Social-media companies are the apotheosis in this framing. They
are the necessary outgrowth of the legal protection that Congress created.
So, in spite of its title, the CDA discourages companies to act with decency.
Under prevailing judicial interpretations of Section 230, companies are free to
leave up or take down unlawful or harmful content as they please. This is a policy
that, in practice, disincentivizes moderation and incentivizes the distribution of
third-party material. It explains, at least in part, Silicon Valley companies’ desire
to hold consumer attention and collect consumer data. In this way, the laissezfaire policy approach set out by Congress and elaborated by the courts has become a perversion of the statute’s titular objective. It is to this to which I turn
next in Part III below.
iii.

commercial des igns and p erverse incentives

Today, social-media companies do much more than simply host or distribute
user-generated content. They solicit, sort, deliver, and amplify content that
holds consumer attention for advertisers. 96
Most companies’ targeted-content delivery systems are not as sophisticated
as those of large and powerful companies like Facebook and YouTube. 97 But
they, too, fashion their sites with advertisers in mind. 98 The Experience Project,
for example, was a website that innocuously aimed to make connections between
anonymous users based on the information that users entered into a straightforward query box. 99 As with most popular online services today, automated decision-making systems were essential to building community groups on the site.
Typing something as simple as “I like dogs” or “I believe in the paranormal”

but it provides an important lesson on the impact of law in preﬁguring how companies develop and deploy technologies.
95. This is the conception that animates the idea of the internet “user.”
96.
97.

98.
99.
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See, e.g., Hao, supra note 19.
See Matt Perault, Well-Intentioned Section 230 Reform Could Entrench the Power of Big Tech,
SLATE (June 1, 2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/06/section-230-reform-antitrustbig-tech-consolidation.html [https://perma.cc/2LPN-5LMH].
See, e.g., Dryoﬀ v. Ultimate So�ware Grp., 934 F.3d 1093, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1094.
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would be enough for the service to make a connection. 100 It would also send
users an email notiﬁcation whenever other users on the site responded to related
inquiries. 101 The company generated income through advertisements, donations, and the sale of tokens that users could spend to communicate with others
in their groups. 102
As the Experience Project’s userbase grew, so too did the range of community
groups that emerged. The company shuttered its service in 2016 103 because, as
commentators in this ﬁeld like to observe, “moderation at scale” is diﬃcult if not
impossible. 104 The Experience Project claimed it had to go oﬄine because of the
“bad apples” that were ﬂocking to the site. 105 And by “bad apples,” it was referring to a sexual predator who had used the site to entrap underage victims and a
murderer who killed a woman he met through its services. 106
Before it closed, the Experience Project’s automated system sent a notiﬁcation to Wesley Greer, who was using the site to meet people and ﬁnd heroin.107
Greer found what he was looking for—and more, as it turns out. He died of fentanyl poisoning a�er unknowingly purchasing heroin laced with fentanyl from
another user. 108 Greer’s mother sued the Experience Project for wrongful death.
100.

Liz Spikol, The Experience Project Is the Worst Social Networking Website, PHILADELPHIA (May
8, 2013, 10:58 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2013/05/08/social-network-experience-project-terrible [https://perma.cc/3TJP-DY9Q].
101. Dryoﬀ, 934 F.3d at 1095.
102.

See Answering Brief of Appellee Ultimate So�ware Grp., Inc. at 15, Dryoﬀ, 934 F.3d 1093 (No.
3:17-cv-05359-LB).

103.

See Dryoﬀ, 934 F.3d at 1095.
104. See Mike Masnick, Content Moderation at Scale Is Impossible: Recent Examples of Misunderstanding Context, TECHDIRT (Feb. 26, 2021, 9:37 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210225/10365146316/content-moderation-scale-is-impossible-recent-examples-misunderstanding-context.shtml [https://perma.cc/6UTM-8BRK] (arguing that large-scale
moderation is impossible because of the diﬃculty of understanding context).
105.

Until We Meet Again, EXPERIENCE PROJECT, http://www.experienceproject.com/until-wemeet-again
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160409092804/http:/www.experienceproject.com/until-we-meet-again].
106. See Teri Knight, Trial Too Traumatic for Victim’s Family; Chilling Blaze Destroys Dairy Barn; Arts
Guild Receives Large Grant, KYMN RADIO (Jan. 13, 2017), https://kymnradio.net/2017/01/13
/trial-traumatic-victims-family-chilling-blaze-kills-animals-arts-guild-receives-large-grant
[https://perma.cc/37AG-BSE7]; Rebecca Roberts, Sting Busts Troy Man Trying to Have Sex
with 13-Year-Old Girl and Her Mom, KTVI FOX 2 (Apr. 10, 2015), https://fox2now.com/news
/sting-busts-troy-man-trying-to-have-sex-with-13-year-old-girl-and-her-mom
[https://
perma.cc/PTK7-Z6XD].
107.

Bob Egelko, Defunct Website Not Culpable in Death of Man from Fentanyl, Court Rules, S.F.
CHRON. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/Defunct-website-notculpable-in-death-of-man-from-14368906.php [https://perma.cc/33LJ-YCV2].
108. Id.
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She argued that he would not have obtained the drugs that killed him without
its services. But she could not prevail in court. Her claim failed because the Experience Project was immune under Section 230 from legal liability. According
to the court, the service merely connected users to likeminded people and communities they sought out. 109 Greer’s mother could not even proceed to an initial
hearing on the question of whether the Experience Project’s service design somehow contributed to the death of her son.
As complicit as social-media sites may seem, courts have barred cases where
plaintiﬀs allege legal fault for design features like anonymity, 110 notiﬁcations,111
recommendations, 112 and location tracking. 113 They have held that those functions only help to deliver the user-generated content that the intermediary receives and, as such, do not rise to the level of “material contribution.” 114 They
have also repeatedly refused to impose duties on an “interactive computers service” to monitor for malicious use of their service or implement safety measures
to protect against known informational harms. 115
In many regards, this legal regime is upside down. By way of comparison,
Greer’s experience with the Experience Project resembles that of the young
adults who have jumped oﬀ “the Vessel,” a “spiraling staircase” in Manhattan’s
Hudson Yards with waist-high guardrails that whimsically climb sixteen stories
into the air. 116 The developers closed access to visitors a�er a third young person
committed suicide by leaping from the structure. 117 There can be little doubt
that, like the Vessel, certain design features for distribution, delivery, and

109.

Dryoﬀ v. Ultimate So�ware Grp., 934 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The recommendation
and notiﬁcation functions helped facilitate this user-to-user communication, but it did not
materially contribute, as Plaintiﬀ argues, to the alleged unlawfulness of the content.”).

110.

Id. at 1100.
111. Id. at 1101.
112.

See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 70 (2d Cir. 2019); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).

113.

See Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x. 586, 590-91 (2d Cir. 2019).
114. Dryoﬀ, 934 F.3d at 1000.
115.

Herrick, 765 F. App’x. at 589-90.
Ed Shanahan & Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, 150-Foot Vessel Sculpture at Hudson Yards Closes
A�er 3rd Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/nyregion/hudson-yards-suicide-vessel.html [https://perma.cc/X9N3-4FEX]; accord Snejana Farberov, Vessel at NYC’s Hudson Yards Is CLOSED Indeﬁnitely Just Days A�er Murder Suspect
Jumped to His Death From 16-Story Sculpture—The Third Suicide Since It Opened Less Than Two
Years Ago, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article9148201/Vessel-NYCs-Hudson-Yards-closed-indeﬁnitely-suicide.html
[https://perma.cc/R4ZD-LUDT].
117. Farberov, supra note 116.
116.
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ampliﬁcation of information can sometimes be predictably dangerous, even if
ostensibly innocuous.
Over the past couple of years, courts have become more scrutinizing of the
ways in which interactive computer-service design impacts online behavior.118
Consider the Force v. Facebook, Inc. case, decided in the Second Circuit. 119 There,
plaintiﬀs had argued that Facebook materially supported terrorism by making
friend recommendations and supporting online groups. 120 The panel rejected
that argument, holding that Facebook could not be sued for enabling foreign
terrorists to meet and collaborate in violation of federal antiterrorism laws. 121
The case is notable, however, because of then-Chief Judge Katzmann’s separate
concurring and dissenting opinion in which he argued that “the CDA does not
protect Facebook’s friend- and content-suggestion algorithms.” 122 In Chief
Judge Katzmann’s reading, neither the statutory text nor the stated purposes of
the statute supported the view that an intermediary gets immunity when it
showcases user-generated data or content. 123 He would have held that Facebook’s recommendations should not count as “publishing” under Section 230(c)(1) because Facebook is, ﬁrst, communicating its own views about
who among its users should be friends and, second, creating “real-world (if digital) connections” with demonstrably real-world consequences. 124
Chief Judge Katzmann’s separate opinion in Force marks an important inﬂection point in the evolution of the doctrine. Over the past couple of years in particular, courts have started to look far more carefully at the ways in which the
designs of interactive computer services cause informational harm. 125 Chief
118.

I have elsewhere argued that courts should be far more alert than they have been to the nuances of internet services’ designs and targeted delivery of information to consumers, especially when they diﬀerentially impact racial minorities and other historically marginalized and
vulnerable groups. See Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs, supra note 10; Sylvain, Intermediary
Duties, supra note 10.

119.

934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019).
120. Id. at 59.
121.

Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2019).
122. Id. at 82 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 82-83.
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 913-18 (9th Cir. 2021) (Berzon, J., concurring)
(quoting and discussing Chief Judge Katzmann’s opinion); id. at 919 (Gould, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (same); Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, (9th Cir. 2021)
(holding that the social-media company was not immune under Section 230 in a claim for
negligent design). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been at the forefront of this
work. It successfully argued, for example, that an online company that promoted false stories
about nutritional supplements across a network of aﬃliated websites was not a mere “publisher” within the meaning of Section 230. FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.
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Judge Katzmann’s opinion cites HomeAway.com v. City of Santa Monica,126 one of
a handful of cases concerning municipal ordinances that impose nonpublishing
duties on online homesharing services to report or register short-term rentals
with public oﬃcials. In cases from Boston to New York to San Francisco, federal
courts have rejected the Section 230 defense on the view that Section 230 “does
not mandate ‘a but-for test that would provide immunity . . . solely because a
cause of action would not otherwise have accrued but for the third-party content.’” 127 An interactive computer service may, at once, distribute third-party
content without fear of liability, but also be subject to legal duties surrounding
how it designs and provides its systems to consumers. Thus, the courts have
determined that homesharing sites, for example, are not free to ignore whether
their guests and hosts are lawfully registered under local housing or hotelier
laws. 128
Amazon, too, has been on the losing end in federal- and state-court litigation
in which plaintiﬀs have alleged that the retail behemoth is a seller (subject to
products liability for product defects) rather than a mere publisher of information from third-party manufacturers.129 Federal and state courts across the
country have been taken by the way Amazon controls the marketing, pricing,
delivery logistics, and general political economy of online consumer retail purchasing. Even if, in any given case, Amazon may not have a duty to warn or monitor third-party products, the courts have generally concluded that the work that
it does behind the scenes is not “publishing.” 130 It is, rather, a seller—for the
purposes of product-liability law, at least. This is to say that, in the eyes of most
2016). The Tenth Circuit has also rejected the Section 230 defense in a federal enforcement
action the FTC brought against a company that sold personal data about people to all comers,
including telephone records, in violation the Telecommunications Act. FTC v. Accusearch
Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197-1201 (10th Cir. 2009). That company operated a website that sold
conﬁdential information it paid third-party researchers to acquire upon its request. This, for
the panel, was not “information provided by another information content provider,” within
the meaning of Section 230. Id. at 1197. The company was “responsible for the development
of the speciﬁc content that was the source of the alleged liability.” Id. at 1198.
126.
127.

128.
129.

130.
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918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019).
Force, 934 F.3d at 82 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
HomeAway.com, Inc., 918 F.3d at 682) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also HomeAway.com, Inc., 918 F.3d at 682 (rejecting the but-for test); Airbnb v. City of Boston, 386 F.
Supp. 3d 113, 120-22 (D. Mass. 2019) (same).
See, e.g., HomeAway.com, Inc., 918 F.3d 676; Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
See, e.g., Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 153 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated, 936 F.3d 182
(3d Cir. 2019); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 2019); Bolger v.
Amazon.com, LLC, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 604 (Ct. App. 2020); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Amazon.com Servs., Inc., 137 N.Y.S.3d 884, 887-89 (Sup. Ct. 2020).
See, e.g., Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 626 (Ct. App. 2020).
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courts, Amazon is a market actor deeply embedded in the marketing and pricing
of consumer products, even if not their manufacturing. An exception, however,
arises in Texas, where the court of last resort held that Amazon is not a “seller”
under state law if the originating manufacturer “do[es] not relinquish title to
[its] products.” 131
Finally, in Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected a Section 230 defense to a claim alleging wrongful death. In that case, the plaintiﬀs argued that
Snapchat, a popular social-media app through which users share disappearing
photos and videos with annotations, negligently contributed to their teenage
sons’ fatal car crash. 132 The Snapchat feature at issue allows users to track their
land speed and share that information with friends through a “Speed Filter,”
which superimposed a real-time speedometer over another image. 133 One plaintiﬀ ’s son was allegedly using this ﬁlter while driving, shortly before running oﬀ
the road at 113 miles per hour and ramming into a tree. 134 The other plaintiﬀ was
in the passenger seat. According to the plaintiﬀs, Snap (the owner of Snapchat)
knew that users went faster than 100 miles per hour on the mistaken belief that
they would be rewarded with in-app “trophies,” 135 but it did not do anything
that eﬀectively dissuaded them from doing so. 136 The young occupants’ parents
sued, alleging that Snap’s “Speed Filter” negligently caused their son’s death. 137
Snapchat moved to dismiss, arguing that the parents’ suit sought to impose liability for publishing user content—here, the driving speed.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Snap’s Section 230 defense, reversing the lower
court’s decision. The panel concluded that the plaintiﬀs’ claims targeted the

131.

See McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2 F.4th 525, 525 (5th Cir. 2021) (mem.) (reversing trial
court a�er seeking and receiving answer from the Supreme Court of Texas in Amazon.com,
Inc. v. McMillan, 625 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2021), on the certiﬁed question of whether Amazon
could be a seller under state law).
132. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1088-90 (9th Cir. 2021).
133.

Id. at 1088. Snap discontinued the Speed Filter in 2021 following criticism that it encouraged
reckless driving. See Bobby Allyn, Snapchat Ends ‘Speed Filter’ That Critics Say Encouraged Reckless Driving, NPR (June 17, 2021, 11:58 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/17/1007385955
/snapchat-ends-speed-ﬁlter-that-critics-say-encouraged-reckless-driving [https://perma.cc
/N7CX-HRS5].
134. 995 F.3d at 1088.
135.

Id. at 1088-89 (describing the ways in which Snapchat rewards users “with trophies, streaks,
and social recognitions based on the snaps they send” and some users’ suspicions that these
rewards are unlocked for using the Speed Filter at more than 100 mph).
136. Id. at 1089-90.
137.

Id. at 1090. The court laid out as a requirement for the plaintiﬀs’ negligence claim that “a
reasonable person would conclude that ‘the reasonably foreseeable harm’” of Snap’s Speed
Filter outweighs its utility. Id. at 1092 (quoting Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 125 (Cal.
2001)).
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design of the application, not Snap as a publisher. 138 According to the Ninth
Circuit, plaintiﬀs’ negligent-design claim faulted Snap solely for Snapchat’s design; the parents contended that the application’s “Speed Filter and reward system worked together to encourage users to drive at dangerous speeds.” 139 It does
not matter, the panel explained, that the company provides “neutral tools,” as
long as plaintiﬀs’ allegations are not addressed to the content that users generate
with those tools. 140 This conclusion, echoing Chief Judge Katzmann’s partial
concurrence in Force, may very well instigate creative new lawsuits that could
better tailor Section 230 doctrine to our times. 141
This emerging view among judges is refreshing because it suggests that
courts are no longer so immediately taken by the pretense that internet companies are mere publishers or distributors of user-generated content—or that they
are mere platforms that do little more than facilitate free expression and human
connection. Sometimes they are. But o�en they are not. The sooner that policy
makers dispense with the romantic story about beneﬁcent online platforms for
user-generated content and recognize their uncontestable pecuniary aims, the
better. 142
iv.

informational inequality

The problem with prevailing Section 230 doctrine today is not only that it
protects online services that amplify and deliver misleading or dangerous information by design. To be sure, this is bad enough because the entities that are
most responsible for distributing and delivering illicit or dangerous content are
the least likely to be held responsible for it. But the principal problems that this
Part highlights are the ways in which powerful online application and service
designs harm people for whom hard-fought public-law consumer protections
(such as civil-rights laws or rules against unfair or deceptive trade practices) are
essential. And yet, under the prevailing Section 230 doctrine, it appears that

138.

Id. at 1093-94.

139.

Id. at 1093.
140. Id. at 1094.
141.

See, e.g., Sam Dean, A Teen Who Was Bullied on Snapchat Died. His Mom Is Suing to Hold Social
Media Liable, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-0510/lawsuit-snap-teen-suicide-yolo-lmk [https://perma.cc/RTW2-DWQE].
142. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other
Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 47 (noting that while “their
assessments of the problem diﬀer, lawmakers agree that Section 230 needs ﬁxing . . . [i]n a
few short years, Section 230 reform eﬀorts have evolved from academic fantasy to legislative
reality”).
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interactive computer services can never be held liable for any of the harms that
they contribute to or cause.
What is worse, most courts resolve Section 230 disputes at the motion to dismiss stage, before discovery can unfold. 143 They do this even as the text of the
statute does not explicitly advert that intention. Courts have chosen to limit their
analysis to the question of whether plaintiﬀs have alleged that the respective defendant interactive computer service is acting as a publisher or distributor of
third-party content or is materially contributing to unlawful content. 144 Courts
rarely, if ever, scrutinize how deeply involved the defendant service is in creating
or developing the oﬀending content. 145 In practice, then, the doctrine has eﬀectively foreclosed any opportunity for the vast majority of plaintiﬀs (or the public
generally) to scrutinize internet companies’ role in the alleged harm. 146 This presents a substantial hurdle to holding intermediaries accountable, even if, in the
end, they are not liable pursuant to plaintiﬀs’ legal theory of the case. This is
especially true given the ways in which the most powerful internet companies
today zealously resist public scrutiny of the systems that animate user experience. 147
My reform proposal is simple: online intermediaries should not be immune
from liability to the extent that their service designs produce outcomes that conﬂict with hard-won but settled legal protections for consumers—including consumer-protection and civil-rights laws and regulations. At a minimum, law in
this area should be far more skeptical of online intermediaries to the extent that
they know that their systems are causing informational harms and that they have
the capacity to stop or prevent. And that burden should be substantial when the
oﬀending content or online conduct harms consumers and members of historically marginalized groups.148

143.

See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d. Cir. 2019); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com,
LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
144. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997); Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008).
145. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168. But see FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d
1187, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding Accusearch, an internet-service provider, accountable for
published content on the grounds that “Accusearch’s actions were not ‘neutral’ with respect to
generating oﬀensive content . . . its actions were intended to generate such content”).
146. See Goldman, supra note 73, at 39-42.
147.

Cf. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 8 (2015) (“Without knowing what Google actually does when it
ranks sites, we cannot assess when it is acting in good faith to help users . . . [a]ll these [algorithms] are protected by laws of secrecy and technologies of obfuscation.”).

148.

I do not here take up the question of which agency should do this, though it seems obvious
that the Federal Trade Commission would be the best ﬁt.
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A. Knowingly Entrenching Inequality
Informational harms spread unevenly across politically or culturally salient
groups. Owing to the way in which structural inequality permeates all aspects of
society, historically marginalized groups and consumers are likely to be the worst
oﬀ in the absence of regulatory checks. 149 Saﬁya Noble identiﬁed this problem a
few years ago in the context of online search. 150 She explained that ostensibly
innocuous terms return and, with each query, entrench prevailing racist and misogynist meanings. In other words, before Google rectiﬁed this problem, when
someone searched for “black girls,” the top results were likely to include sexualized or debasing terms, while the top search results for “white girls” tended to
be less degrading.
These same problems continue, even as Noble’s writing (and that of others)
has raised awareness about the ways in which putatively neutral technologies
perpetuate or entrench extant inequalities. 151 These consequences could be highstakes—even life-or-death. Consider, for instance, that some social-media companies distributed information about COVID-19 safety, treatment, and vaccinations to Black people far less than to other groups during the height of the
pandemic. 152 Indeed, those belonging to all other racial categories saw signiﬁcantly more public-health announcements from the Department of Health and
Human Services and other public-health bodies. 153 Consider also the ways in

149.

See generally DARIA ROTHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN
WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (arguing that white socioeconomic advantage is self-perpetuating); William Julius Wilson, Toward a Framework for Understanding Forces That Contribute to
or Reinforce Racial Inequality, 1 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 3 (2009) (proposing a framework for understanding the formation and perpetuation of racial inequality).
150. See generally SAFIYA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE
RACISM (2018); Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classiﬁcation, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77 (2018),
(showing that automated facial-recognition so�ware has lower error rates for lighter-skinned
men than darker-skinned women).
151.

See Michelle Ruiz, Saﬁya Noble Knew the Algorithm Was Oppressive, VOGUE (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://www.vogue.com/article/saﬁya-noble [https://perma.cc/UKZ6-3ZZQ] (discussing
ongoing problems); Chris Stokel-Walker, Is Social Media Racist by Design?, ESQUIRE (Nov. 20,
2020), https://www.esquire.com/uk/culture/a34532613/social-media-racism [https://perma
.cc/GAJ8-YLXJ] (same).
152. Corin Faife & Dara Kerr, Oﬃcial Information About COVID-19 Is Reaching Fewer Black People
on Facebook, MARKUP (Mar. 4, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/citizen-browser/2021
/03/04/oﬃcial-information-about-covid-19-is-reaching-fewer-black-people-on-facebook
[https://perma.cc/XK8B-MPT9].
153. Id. Perversely, reports suggest that these communities were also more likely to suﬀer from
biased risk-prediction algorithms in medicine. See Donna M. Christensen, Jim Manley & Jason Resendez, Medical Algorithms Are Failing Communities of Color, HEALTH AFFS. (Sept. 9,
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which political operatives sought to deﬂate faith in the administration of elections among Black and Brown people with misleading and false information,
eﬀectively disenfranchising those groups. 154
These are direct informational harms that social media can stop and prevent.
There can be little doubt about this last point. In the lead up to the 2020 election,
for example, Facebook proudly announced that it would ratchet down content
from putative news sources that are notorious for distributing disinformation,
only to revert back to amplifying that material in the month or so a�er electors
registered their votes. 155
There are few legal remedies for the distribution of high-stakes falsehoods
and informational harms like these. Of course, there are rules that forbid the
distribution of false election or nutritional or ingredient information—that is,
information about the time and place of an election or information about food
and drugs. 156 But these laws probably do not prohibit falsity in campaign material or dangerous medical advice from laypeople. 157 In which case, online companies would owe no legal obligation to take these down under a reformed Section 230 doctrine.158
But there are certain kinds of informational harms for which the stakes are
so high that their distribution is or should be unlawful. Current laws and judicial
2021), https://www.healthaﬀairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210903.976632/full [https://
perma.cc/C4KK-HZDS].
154. Shannon Bond, Black and Latino Voters Flooded with Disinformation in Election’s Final Days,
NPR (Oct. 30, 2020, 7:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/30/929248146/black-and-latino-voters-ﬂooded-with-disinformation-in-elections-ﬁnal-days [https://perma.cc/3GWFTGRA].
155. Nick Statt, Facebook Tweaked the News Feed to Highlight More Mainstream News Sources A�er the
Election,
VERGE
(Nov.
24,
2020,
11:35
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/24/21612728/facebook-news-feed-us-election-change-mainstream-newsmisinformation [https://perma.cc/FW32-VARP].
156. See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 n.4 (2018) (“We do not doubt that the
State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures.”); Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (“Advertisers should
not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation simply by including references to public issues.”).
157.

See generally Richard Hasen, Drawing the Line Between False Election Speech and False Campaign
Speech, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. UNIV. (Oct. 12, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/drawing-the-line-between-false-election-speech-and-false-campaign-speech
[https://perma.cc/Q2TL-WPLJ].

158.

This is say nothing of the First Amendment. See Prager Univ. v. Google, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.
2020) (holding that the state-action doctrine under the First Amendment bars constitutional
scrutiny of an internet company’s decisions to remove or takedown third-party content); cf.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 7090 (2012) (holding that a federal statute that criminalized
false claims about military service is unconstitutional because it “targets falsity and nothing
more”).
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doctrine, for example, strictly forbid advertising that discriminates against people on the basis of protected classiﬁcations like race, gender, or age in high stakes
areas like hiring, consumer ﬁnance, and housing. 159 These are rules that apply
with equal force to advertisers and third-party intermediaries (that are not
online) as much as the companies whose services and products are being marketed. 160 And yet, due to the protection for interactive computer services under
Section 230, restrictive discriminatory advertising has proliferated across these
sectors. 161 Under the broad and prevailing interpretation of Section 230(c)(1),
nothing in the law obligates these companies to take down or prevent its distribution even when they know it exists.
Online companies’ capacity to control the delivery of these unlawful kinds of
content, particularly when the disparities ostensibly leave historically marginalized groups less well oﬀ, would go unaddressed were it not for intrepid journalism. More to the point, the prevailing interpretation of Section 230 permits companies like these to rest easy and proceed “unfettered,” 162 even when they know
that their services facilitate informational disparities. Reddit, like Backpage before it, knowingly hosts child pornography.163 Dating sites like Tinder and
OKCupid do not screen for sexual predators. 164 The law likely does not require

159.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018) (rules under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); 12
C.F.R. pt. 1002, supp. I, ¶ 6(a)-2 (2021) (rules under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 24
C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2021) (rules under the Fair Housing Act); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous.
& Cmty. Aﬀs. v. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (recognizing that disparateimpact claims are “consistent with the [Fair Housing Act’s] central purpose”). See generally
Stephen Hayes & Kali Schellenberg, Discrimination Is “Unfair”: Interpreting UDA(A)P to Prohibit Discrimination, STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. (Apr. 2021), https://protectborrowers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Discrimination_is_Unfair.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JSV7-AKNK] (proposing a theory of unfairness under Section 5 of the
FTC Act, codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. § 45, that would help to ﬁll gaps in current antidiscrimination
law).

160.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018) (Fair Housing Act); 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, supp. I, ¶ 6(a)-2
(2021) (rules implementing the Fair Housing Act).

161.

See, e.g., Aaron Rieke & Corrine Yu, Discrimination’s Digital Frontier, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/facebook-targeted-marketing-perpetuates-discrimination/587059 [https://perma.cc/2PJ7-7B8C]; Rory Cellan-Jones, Facebook
Accused of Allowing Sexist Job Advertising, BBC (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news
/technology-58487026 [https://perma.cc/7BZT-VYC4].
162. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2018).
163.

Bob Van Voris, Reddit Provides ‘Safe Haven’ for Child Porn, Lawsuit Claims, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr.
23, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/tech-and-telecom-law
/X45M1264000000 [https://perma.cc/2QN9-RSQF]; see also Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com,
LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).

164.

Hillary Flynn, Keith Cousins & Elizabeth Naismith Picciani, Tinder Lets Known Sex Oﬀenders
Use the App. It’s Not the Only One, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 2, 2019, 10:30 AM),
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them to do anything in these settings—even when they have knowledge that illegal conduct is afoot. 165
This prevailing interpretation contorts Section 230’s purposes in at least two
ways. First, it ﬂips the ostensible Good Samaritan purpose of the statute upside
down by removing the burden to abide by consumer-protection laws. The doctrine in this way creates a disincentive to care rather than an incentive to selfregulate, as the Zeran panel presumed. 166 Second, it leaves consumers without
any eﬀective legal mechanism to mitigate or redress online informational harms.
Danielle Citron, Ben Wittes, and Mary Anne Franks have proposed that intermediaries enjoy the beneﬁt of the Good Samaritan safe harbor if they take “reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of” their service. 167 This reform aims to operationalize the stated objectives of the Good Samaritan
purposes of the statute by creating a functional safe harbor for companies that
actually regulate third-party content. Holding companies responsible for the
harmful material to take reasonable steps to takedown or block such content
would help to redress some of the power imbalances at work, particularly because those companies control content distribution. Such a duty would also shi�
some of the costs of unlawful or harmful content on to the entities best equipped
to prevent them.
Legislators could also impose a burden on the companies that know that
their services cause harm. There is nothing earth shattering in this idea. A�er all,
it has been taken as an article of faith among torts professors for over ﬁve decades
now. 168 As to internet companies in particular, this reform idea only echoes insights set out over a decade ago by Rebecca Tushnet in a law-review essay on the

https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hillaryﬂynn/tinder-lets-known-sex-oﬀenders-usethe-app-its-not-the [https://perma.cc/RHH6-XY8H].
165.

Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019); Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands,
Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016). Under the prevailing doctrine, companies only owe a
duty to warn their users about third-party malfeasance on their site when they obtain actual
knowledge of such activity “from an outside source” (i.e., not through any content or material
that consumers directly post to their services). Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853. In that circumstance, they are no longer acting as an online publisher within the meaning of the statute. Id.;
see also HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2019) (ﬁnding that, in Internet Brands, the “underlying legal duty at issue did not seek to hold the defendant liable as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of third-party content” (quoting Internet Brands, 824
F.3d at 853)).

166.

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
167. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans
§ 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 419 (2017); Citron & Franks, supra note 142, at 71.
168. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 312 (1970)
(arguing that costs should be borne by those best-equipped to prevent them). See generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982) (same).
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subject. 169 There, just twelve years a�er Congress passed Section 230, she presciently argued that legislators and policy makers should be alert to the relative
social costs of granting broad speech rights or immunity to intermediaries for
third-party material. 170 It is not at all obvious, she explained, that those protections would engender a sense of responsibility to moderate because the pecuniary aims of those companies, even then, did not necessarily align with those of
users. 171 Thus, she explained, courts have adjusted “the procedure, rather than
the substance, of speech torts in order to balance the costs of harmful speech
with the beneﬁts of speech that is useful but vulnerable to chilling eﬀects.” 172
The law of defamation in particular oﬀers helpful insights into how Section 230 reformers might tinker with knowledge requirements in order to serve
other important public-regarding norms. Among other considerations, defamation law conditions the size and nature of penalties on intentionality as well as
the respective target of the content. 173 Speciﬁcally, journalistic norms of truthseeking and veriﬁcation have been important to the courts’ adjudication of defamation claims that require courts to determine whether a defendant journalist
acted maliciously. 174 The qualiﬁed reporter’s privilege also oﬀers some helpful
169.

See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008).
170. Id. at 1002-04.
171.
172.

Id. at 1010-11 (“Ironically—given § 230’s title—immunity alone has not generally been suﬃcient to convince ISPs to monitor content.”).

Id. at 1013.
173. Id. at 1013-14. I mention here without discussing in any detail that Justices Thomas and Gorsuch recently mused about reforming the law of defamation for the internet age in their separate dissents to the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in Berisha v. Lawson. 141 S. Ct. 2424,
2424 (2021) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). There, Thomas characteristically observed
that there is nothing in the constitutional text to support the public-ﬁgure rule set out in New
York Times v. Sullivan, the seminal case in the area of defamation law. Id. at 2425 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Gorsuch meanwhile doubts that the technological changes to the “media landscape” support such a rule. Id. at 2427 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). They are not the only Supreme Court Justices to have expressed reservations about the current doctrine. When she
was an academic, Justice Elena Kagan penned two articles on the topic, expressing skepticism
toward the doctrine if not the same level of hostility as Thomas or Gorsuch. See Elena Kagan,
A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 197, 202 (1993) (reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991)); Elena
Kagan, Libel and the First Amendment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1608-09 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000).
174. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968); Dodds v. Am. Broad. Co., 145 F.3d
1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The professional journalistic norms of truth-seeking and veriﬁcation do not ﬁt well with today’s attention-driven business models for online companies. This might be because these norms are
inapposite, having emerged from the particular nineteenth-century political economy of the
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cues. There, courts explicitly consider whether, during the course of grand jury
proceedings or even in a criminal trial, a subpoenaed reporter who bears the indicia of a professional journalist may decline a government request to testify.175
In the context of both defamation and the reporter’s privilege, the question of
whether the defendant or witness engages in the process of truth seeking is not
dispositive, but important. These doctrines protect companies’ good-faith efforts to attend to the quality or veracity of the content they publish.
It would be fully consistent with these longstanding principles to obligate
companies with the knowledge of and demonstrable capacity to control the (automated) distribution, ampliﬁcation, and delivery of harmful content. Two reform proposals in the current session of the House of Representatives do precisely that. 176 One, for example, would exempt from Section 230 protection
services that amplify online material that violates civil rights in particular. 177 Another proposal would carve out civil-rights violations, as well as other informational harms to consumers and historically marginalized groups. 178 This reform,
moreover, would not have to require that companies aﬃrmatively monitor for
illegal or illicit content that they publish or amplify. One of the more notable
bipartisan recent reform proposals in the Senate, for example, would require interactive computer services to remove any material that a court has adjudged to
be unlawful within four days of receiving notice of that order. 179

mass media, print news business. Midcentury regulatory interventions like the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) fairness doctrine and equal-time rule—policy reforms to
which a handful of contemporary activists and writers have sought to retroﬁt to the internet—
do not reveal much about this because objectivity and veriﬁcation had emerged decades before
the FCC promulgated those rules. This is to say nothing of whether such rules are administrable in an ecosystem as complex and varied as the current networked information market.
175. See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Wigand, 228 A.D. 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 632 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing a qualiﬁed privilege for journalists to
maintain the conﬁdentiality of a newsperson’s sources and information).
176. See Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, H.R. 8636, 116th Cong. (2020);
Justice Against Malicious Algorithms Act, H.R. 5596, 117th Cong. (2021).
177. See H.R. 8636. This provision would do better to cover all civil-rights laws rather than carve
out ampliﬁcation that violates any speciﬁc statute—let alone one that is not as commonly invoked by aggrieved plaintiﬀs.
178.

See Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner, Warner, Hirono, Klobuchar Announce the Safe Tech
Act to Reform Section 230 (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/warner-hirono-klobuchar-announce-the-safe-tech-act-to-reform-section230 [https://perma.cc/P2BD-DLKQ ].

179.

See Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act, S. 797, 117th Cong. § 5
(c)(1)(A)(i) (2021).
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B. Discriminatory Restrictive Targeting
Internet companies also facilitate discrimination on their platforms when
they deliver targeted advertising that is personal to each consumer. These advertisements present a diﬀerent kind of harm because, most of the time, their scope
is diﬃcult for outsiders to discern. Worse, however, are the ways in which intermediaries openly enable advertisers to target audiences on the basis of protected
categories like race, gender, and age (among hundreds, if not thousands, of other
characteristics) in commercial campaigns for housing, employment, and consumer ﬁnance, where hard fought civil-rights laws forbid advertisements that
explicitly or intentionally solicit or exclude audiences on the basis of those dimensions. 180 Google reportedly allowed employers and landlords to discriminate against nonbinary and some transgender people, pledging to crack down
on the practice only a�er being alerted to it by journalists. 181 Facebook’s Ad Manager openly enables advertisers to target audiences by including or excluding
people on the basis of thousands of demographic categories or proxies for those
categories. 182
Again, restrictive targeting is especially pernicious because victims are never
the worse for knowing that they have been excluded. That is, even as many social-media companies oﬀer individual users relatively particularized explanations for why they see any given advertisement, consumers do not learn about
the content that they do not see. It takes resource-intensive analyses by intrepid
researchers from outside of the company to uncover these practices. Unrelenting
“data journalism” by Politico and The Markup in particular has uncovered patterns of discrimination in housing, employment, and consumer credit on
180.

Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/852Y-7RZS]. See generally Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs, supra note 10 (discussing how Facebook Ads enables the exclusion of racial minorities
from the audience for housing advertisements and old people from the audience for job advertisements); Sylvain, Intermediary Duties, supra note 10 (discussing the ability to target different demographic groups with social-media advertisements); Gillian B. White, When Algorithms
Don’t
Account
for
Civil
Rights,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
7,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/facebook-ad-discrimination/518718
[https://perma.cc/S9UC-PU83] (discussing discriminatory advertising on social-media platforms and other websites).
181. Jeremy B. Merrill, Google Has Been Allowing Advertisers to Exclude Nonbinary People from Seeing
Job Ads, MARKUP (Feb. 11, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/google-the-giant/2021/02/11/google-has-been-allowing-advertisers-to-exclude-nonbinary-people-fromseeing-job-ads [https://perma.cc/P2PU-JH6W].
182. Alexia Fernández Campbell, Job Ads on Facebook Discriminated Against Women and Older Workers, EEOC Says, VOX (Sept. 25, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/9/25/20883446/facebook-job-ads-discrimination [https://perma.cc/L5A7-4FN4].
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Facebook’s Ad Manager. 183 For example, they have revealed that the Ad Manager
allows credit-card companies, housing brokers, and employers to exclude, respectively, young people, racial minorities, and women from advertisements
about their services and programs. 184 Facebook eventually promised to stop the
practice, agreeing with civil-rights groups and plaintiﬀs in 2019 to bar the use of
protected categories in those areas. 185 But in spite of these promises, patterns of
age and sex discrimination persist. 186
The solutions here are straightforward. Commercial content of any kind,
whether online or in the physical world, that has the direct eﬀect of discriminating against consumers on the basis of legislatively protected characteristics (e.g.,
race, sex, and age) in markets where civil-rights laws forbid the practice (e.g.,
housing, education, employment, and consumer ﬁnance) is (or should be) forbidden. 187 This reform would attend to outcomes rather than the input variables
or decision-making processes on which companies rely to deliver content. This
is because automated decision-making systems discover salient patterns in the
combination of the most innocuous consumer variables (like food tastes and
thousands of others), even when developers exclude them; together, they apparently act as a virtual proxy for protected categories. 188 Recall that, in spite of the
183.

The principal person to credit for this line of reporting is Julia Angwin who, before starting
The Markup, led teams that reported on the Ad Manager at Politico.

184.

See Angwin & Parris, supra note 180; see also supra note 181 (discussing Google allowing advertisers to exclude nonbinary people from job advertisements); infra note 186 (discussing
Facebook’s advertisement algorithms excluding women from job advertisements).
185. Pema Levy, Facebook Settles Civil Rights Lawsuits Over Ad Discrimination, MOTHER JONES (Mar.
19, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/facebook-settles-civil-rightslawsuits-over-ad-discrimination [https://perma.cc/F76Z-G7WN]; Fair Housing Groups Settle Lawsuit with Facebook: Transforms Facebook’s Ad Platform Impacting Millions of Users, NAT’L
FAIR HOUS. ALL. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://nationalfairhousing.org/2019/03/18/national-fairhousing-alliance-settles-lawsuit-with-facebook-transforms-facebooks-ad-platform-impacting-millions-of-users [https://perma.cc/2G5S-Z5PE]. I was a consultant in one of the ﬁve
civil-rights cases that Facebook settled in March 2019. See Olivier Sylvain, A Watchful Eye on
Facebook’s Advertising Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/03/28/opinion/facebook-ad-discrimination-race.html [https://perma.cc/RBA9-S4GK].
186. Hao, supra note 3; Faife & Ng, supra note 3.
187.
188.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.4 (2021).
See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671,
677-87 (2016). See generally Talia Gillis, The Input Fallacy, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571266 [https://perma.cc/L58J-2AYA] (showing that laws that
forbid the use of race, gender, and other protected categories as input variables in automated
decision-making systems in lending do not protect against discriminatory outcomes on those
dimensions). Such outcomes may also be the result of defects in the problem deﬁnition in the
early stages of development, the nature and source of the data on which the system is “trained”
and “tested,” or a mismatch with the speciﬁc context in which they are deployed. See Barocas
& Selbst, supra.
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March 2019 settlement with plaintiﬀs in which Facebook agreed to forbid the
use of protected categories in ads for housing, employment, and consumer ﬁnance, patterns of discrimination on the basis of age and gender persisted over
two years a�er the settlement. 189 Companies in these circumstances should not
be able to invoke the Section 230 defense—at least not before discovery uncovers
whether and how they serve advertisements to their users in ways that violate
civil rights and other consumer protections.
Proponents of the current regime may protest that such reforms would unduly burden companies and chill the distribution of too much lawful third-party
content. But that is a burden that the dra�ers and advocates of these hard-fought
laws imposed in consideration of the social costs of discrimination and disparate
consumer harm. The challenge is ﬁnding the right balance between innovation
and speech on the one hand and equality on the other.
Today, Section 230 protections have set this balance exceptionally out of
whack. The burdens that practically all other companies in practically all other
legislative ﬁelds must carry should certainly be applicable to social-media companies, too, especially considering their enormous inﬂuence on public life. Of
course, the reforms I propose would not eradicate racism and other consumer
harms from internet platforms. Patterns of subordination pervade all public life.
But if civil-rights law and other consumer protections are to be eﬀective in today’s networked information economy, internet companies ought to be held accountable for the ways in which their services entrench inequality. Current Section 230 doctrine makes that terriﬁcally diﬃcult, if not impossible.
conclusion
Powerful internet companies design their services in ways that facilitate illegal discrimination and other consumer harms. This is reason enough for reform.
This Essay’s lessons are twofold. First, most internet companies have the formidable capacity to redress these practices, but do not do so until they are called
to task pursuant to a court order or an explosive news report.190 Second, even
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Jeﬀ Horwitz, Facebook Algorithm Shows Gender Bias in Job Ads, Study Finds, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
9, 2021, 1:12 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-shows-men-and-women-different-job-ads-study-ﬁnds-11617969600 [https://perma.cc/TN22-UK84]; Faife & Ng, supra
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Consider by way of ironic context that Google deliberately blocks advertisers from using terms
associated with Black Lives Matter and related progressive social-justice movements to post
ads alongside YouTube videos and channels. Leon Yin & Aaron Sankin, Google Blocks Advertisers from Targeting Black Lives Matter YouTube Videos, MARKUP (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://themarkup.org/google-the-giant/2021/04/09/google-blocks-advertisers-from-targeting-black-lives-matter-youtube-videos [https://perma.cc/Y9XJ-PMEM].
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when called to task, these companies invoke Section 230 immunity before discovery can reveal whether or how they are implicated in the unlawful content or
conduct. It is no surprise that the companies would proceed in this way. Courts
have been relatively solicitous of online companies’ claims to the protection. It is
only recently that some prominent courts and judges have evinced skepticism,
in recognition of the ways that service designs necessarily create the harms that
ensue. 191
While I have elsewhere argued that courts should do more,192 it is time for
Congress to reform the statute to comport to the current state of aﬀairs. It can
do this by amending the statute so that companies bear the legal duty to block
or prevent the ampliﬁcation or delivery of online content that they know to be
unlawful. This is especially important for content that harms consumers and
members of historically marginalized groups—that is, people who have few if
any other legal avenues for redress.
Today, Section 230’s broad protections empower social-media companies to
think that they are above the fray, inoculated from bearing responsibility for the
services they develop. This turn away from public obligation is corrosive. The
time for course correction is overdue.
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